On the reality of the conjunction fallacy.

Full Abstract

Attributing higher "probability" to a sentence of form p-and-q, relative to p, is a reasoning fallacy only if (1) the word probability carries its modern, technical meaning and (2) the sentence p is interpreted as a conjunct of the conjunction p-and-q. Legitimate doubts arise about both conditions in classic demonstrations of the conjunction fallacy. We used betting paradigms and unambiguously conjunctive statements to reduce these sources of ambiguity about conjunctive reasoning. Despite the precautions, conjunction fallacies were as frequent under betting instructions as under standard probability instructions.

Author information

Author/s: Sides, Ashley (A); Osherson, Daniel (D); Bonini, Nicolao (N); Viale, Riccardo (R);

Affiliation: Rice University, Houston, Texas 77251-1892, USA.

Journal and publication information

Publication Type: Journal Article

Journal: Memory & cognition (Mem Cognit), published in United States. (Language: eng)

Reference: 2002-Mar; vol 30 (issue 2) : pp 191-8

Dates: Created 2002/05/30; Completed 2002/06/14; Revised 2004/11/17;

PMID: 12035881, status: MEDLINE (last retrieved date: 2/18/2009)

Sourced from the National Library of Medicine. Abstract text and other information may be subject to copyright.

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