A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity.

Full Abstract

Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.

Author information

Author/s: Panchanathan, Karthik (K); Boyd, Robert (R);

Affiliation: Department of Anthropology, University of California, Haines Hall 341 Box 951553, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA. buddha(-atsign-)ucla.edu

Journal and publication information

Publication Type: Journal Article; Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.

Journal: Journal of theoretical biology (J Theor Biol), published in England. (Language: eng)

Reference: 2003-Sep; vol 224 (issue 1) : pp 115-26

Dates: Created 2003/08/05; Completed 2003/11/06; Revised 2006/11/15;

PMID: 12900209, status: MEDLINE (last retrieval date: 2/18/2009, IMS Date: )

Sourced from the National Library of Medicine. Abstract text and other information may be subject to copyright.

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