Re-visions of rationality?

Full Abstract

The appeal of simple algorithms that take account of both the constraints of human cognitive capacity and the structure of environments has been an enduring theme in cognitive science. A novel version of such a boundedly rational perspective views the mind as containing an 'adaptive toolbox' of specialized cognitive heuristics suited to different problems. Although intuitively appealing, when this version was proposed, empirical evidence for the use of such heuristics was scant. I argue that in the light of empirical studies carried out since then, it is time this 'vision of rationality' was revised. An alternative view based on integrative models rather than collections of heuristics is proposed.

Author information

Author/s: Newell, Ben R (BR);

Affiliation: School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. ben.newell(-atsign-)unsw.edu.au <ben.newell(-atsign-)unsw.edu.au>

Journal and publication information

Publication Type: Journal Article; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't; Review

Journal: Trends in cognitive sciences (Trends Cogn Sci), published in England. (Language: eng)

Reference: 2005-Jan; vol 9 (issue 1) : pp 11-5

Dates: Created 2005/01/10; Completed 2005/05/27; Revised 2008/11/21;

PMID: 15639435, status: MEDLINE (last retrieved date: 2/18/2009)

Sourced from the National Library of Medicine. Abstract text and other information may be subject to copyright.

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