Empirical ethics and its alleged meta-ethical fallacies.

Full Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies.

Author information

Author/s: de Vries, Rob (R); Gordijn, Bert (B);

Affiliation: Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, IQ Healthcare, Section Ethics, Philosophy & History of Medicine, The Netherlands. r.devries(-atsign-)iq.umcn.nl

Journal and publication information

Publication Type: Journal Article; Review

Journal: Bioethics (Bioethics), published in England. (Language: eng)

Reference: 2009-May; vol 23 (issue 4) : pp 193-201

Dates: Created 2009/04/02; Completed 2009/08/07;

PMID: 19338520, status: MEDLINE (last retrieval date: 8/21/2009, IMS Date: )

Sourced from the National Library of Medicine. Abstract text and other information may be subject to copyright.

External Links for this article
(including full text providers, if available):

Click Electronic Full-text Provider Links to see options for finding the electronic full text links to this article. Note there may be a subscription or fee required for access to the full text. See our FAQ for information on finding FREE full text articles.

This article may also be located in paper journal collections available in many libraries. Use the Journal and Publication Information above to find the full article.