Positive interactions promote public cooperation.

Full Abstract

The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be more effective than reward for maintaining cooperation in public goods games. The typical design of these studies, however, represses future consequences for today's actions. In an experimental setting, we compare public goods games followed by punishment, reward, or both in the setting of truly repeated games, in which player identities persist from round to round. We show that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff. We conclude that reward outperforms punishment in repeated public goods games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others.

Author information

Author/s: Rand, David G (DG); Dreber, Anna (A); Ellingsen, Tore (T); Fudenberg, Drew (D); Nowak, Martin A (MA);

Affiliation: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.

Journal and publication information

Publication Type: Journal Article; Research Support, N.I.H., Extramural; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't; Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.

Journal: Science (New York, N.Y.) (Science), published in United States. (Language: eng)

Reference: 2009-Sep; vol 325 (issue 5945) : pp 1272-5

Dates: Created 2009/09/04; Completed 2009/09/18;

PMID: 19729661, status: MEDLINE (last retrieval date: 9/18/2009, IMS Date: )

Sourced from the National Library of Medicine. Abstract text and other information may be subject to copyright.

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